Sandy J. Pratama, Defence Research Analyst, Semar Sentinel.

This year is expected to mark a significant milestone for the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL). On February 12, the Chief of Naval Staff (KASAL), Admiral Muhammad Ali, announced that the aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi would be delivered from Italy ahead of the anniversary of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) on October 5, 2026.

The aircraft carrier not only serves as a symbol of prestige and the pride of the navy, but also a willingness to test the upper bounds of Indonesia’s naval ambition beyond its littoral sphere. Moreover, the second Multipurpose Offshore Patrol Vessel (PPA) frigate, KRI Prabu Siliwangi, is also on track for delivery. Departing from the La Spezia Naval Base in February, the ship has been on a long voyage, visiting various ports and conducting naval diplomacy before arriving in September in Indonesia. 

While it’s true that TNI AL still lacked an adequate number of hulls, compensating for the quantity alone doesn’t guarantee the desired capability, let alone effectiveness. This is an important lesson learned from the Iranian Navy and its Revolutionary Guard counterpart. On March 11, the Commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper, claimed that the US had taken out more than 60 Iranian ships during 10 days of Operation Epic Fury- equal to 90% of the Iranian Navy’s inventory[1]. Among the ships sunk, IRIS Makran and IRIS Shahid Bagheri are the most notable due to their role as light aircraft carriers for launching drones. 

Indeed, there is no way the Iranian navy is on par with US forces. Only belatedly, in the past decade, has Tehran begun to place greater emphasis on developing its naval posture. This was marked by the introduction of locally built frigates and corvettes, as well as the conversion of a commercial tanker into a makeshift aircraft carrier. On the other hand, the Revolutionary Guard Navy has been focused on building asymmetrical capabilities to counter much superior forces. 

These include utilising kamikaze boats, mines, drones, and missiles, which were dispersed around the Persian Gulf. 

While there are inherent differences between the TNI AL and the Iranian Navy, this should not lead to complacency. Ignoring valuable lessons learned from the Iranian Navy risks a similar calamity for TNI AL in the future. The Iranian navy, in particular, and its defensive posture in general, have failed to prevent US and Israeli air control over its airspace. During the war, the US and Israelis aircraft have been operating with impunity and freedom over the Iranian airspace. This indicated the attainment of a high degree of air control, whether in the form of air superiority or air supremacy. 

The failure partly stems from Tehran’s overt reliance on ground-based, fixed air defence systems[1]. Such a system has proven to be prone to ground sabotage operations. Israel, for instance, has deployed special operations troops to intercept and destroy the missile system on the ground by employing anti-tank guided missiles and small drones. While some systems, such as S-300 and Tor as well as locally made Bavar-373 and Raad, are designed to be mobile, satellite imagery suggests they’re rarely repositioned from their fixed bases—even after being attacked last year.

This, in turn, makes the job of adversary sabotage or strike units significantly easier. Moreover, Iran’s layered missile defence system—which operates US, Russian, and locally made systems—appears not so integrated. Leaving them essentially alone against a complex multi-domain air, ground, electronic, and cyber SEAD/DEAD operations. 

For its part, the Iranian Navy maintains a modest air defence system. On paper, the Jamaran class frigate and Shahid Soleimani corvette possess Sayyad-2 medium range missile defence system, a copy of the US RIM-66 Talon. But such capabilities are unevenly distributed across the fleet. Many vessels are left equipped only with anti-aircraft guns and MANPADS—an arrangement strikingly like that of many ships in the TNI AL[2]. The resulting fate is predictable. Once the ground-based system is degraded or suppressed, the fleet becomes significantly exposed to air attacks, while the onboard system offers little to no protection. 

Iranian asymmetric capability might survive the enemy’s airstrike, but its operation has been hampered. The US and its allies’ forces continue to snatch these asymmetric crawlers, albeit burning through years of magazine stockpiles. Iran has launched approximately 2,500 drones and 1,100 missiles, with 90-95% of them being intercepted. Simultaneously, US and Israelis aircraft further intensify the airstrike, targeting the launchers and storage to further degrade Iran’s strike capability.

Some might argue that the war has turned into attritional warfare. But even asymmetric or attritional warfare suffers when defensive posture fails. Ukraine serves as an example of a successful asymmetric force to contain the Russian Black Sea Fleet, in part due to its ability to deny the freedom of the Russian Aerospace Force (VKS)[3]. 

In addition to air warfare, the sub-surface warfare also gained traction. The sinking of IRIS Dena, 20 miles off the coast of Sri Lanka, by a nuclear submarine serves as a good reminder that the threat of submarine warfare isn’t diminishing at all. The Iranian ship is notably equipped with torpedo tubes to defend itself against an undersea threat. But lacking adequate sensors and a detection platform renders it ineffective against the submarine. While it seems to be a contained case, the threat of a submarine has forced two Iranian navy ships to seek refuge in India and Sri Lanka. It’s noteworthy that the attack took place in the Indian Ocean—a backyard in the Indonesian strategic context. 

One last factor that contributes to the destruction of the Iranian fleet is the apparent lack of readiness. The fact that 2/3 of the Iranian ships were sunk on the pier-side of the port, not in the open ocean, is telling. Not only because of the disruption of command, control, and communication (C3) due to cyber attack or decapitation strike, but also the fleet readiness level is apparently low even in the emergence of conflict.

This is not surprising since the navy is considerably at the bottom of the priority list among other Iranian armed branches, resulting in a lack of funds and proper maintenance[4]. Its submarine posture, for instance, consists of three Kilo-class submarines and dozens of midget submarines—supposedly enough to deter and threaten the US fleet in the Arabian Sea. Yet evidently, all were wrecked in Bandar Abbas dry dock—implying that they’re not in active service. 

For Indonesia, the stakes are unmistakable. The TNI AL’s outward turn beyond its immediate territorial confines is a necessary step, but platforms alone do not constitute power. Deterrence rests on credibility—the demonstrable capacity to generate and sustain operational effects under contested conditions.

Recent naval warfare in the Persian Gulf underscores a persistent lesson: ambition unmoored from integration, preparedness, and maintenance is strategically hollow. The inability to counter evolving threats or to operate as a coherent networked force will rapidly erode combat effectiveness. In such circumstances, even ostensibly modern fleets are reduced to merely vulnerable assets. In the absence of these foundations, naval expansion risks becoming performative, projecting the image of strength without its substance. 

[1] According to IISS Military Balance+ data, the Iranian Navy possess 70 naval vessels before the war 

[2] Due to sections and arms embargoes, the Iranian Air Forces has been left in its minimum capability, leaving the air defence role into a more available ground based air defence system. 

[3] Only two Raden Eddy Martadinata Class and the recently acquired two Brawijaya class frigates that possess a considerable air defence system. Mostly, if not all, TNI AL ships were equipped only with short-range missiles and anti-aircraft cannon. 

[4] The VKS employed attack helicopters and fighter jets to counter Ukrainian USV at sea. However, its operational freedom was limited by Ukrainian Air Defence missiles located in the coastal city of the Black Sea. The arrival of USV equipped with surface to air missiles also further hamper VKS operations especially after it downed two Su-30 fighter jets and two helicopters in 2025. This resulted in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet practically confined at their port due to the USV threat. 

[5] After the 1979 revolution, the Islamic regime favored the Revolutionary Guard despite the Armed Force’s loyalty during the Iran-Iraq war. Although the Navy was reorganized in 2017, readiness and maintenance issues still persist due to lack of resources and fund as well as arms embargoes and sanctions. More on https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1028527.pdf  

Sandy J. Pratama is CBDS Young Research Fellow and Defence Research Analyst at Semar Sentinel.