Jennifer

Timor Leste has applied for its official accession to ASEAN since 2011, and at the same time, ASEAN has also transformed into a regional institution through a ruled based mechanism since the enactment of the ASEAN Charter in 2008. The ASEAN Charter applies admission criteria that were not listed in the 1967 Declaration of Bangkok, which was previously used as ASEAN’s legal instrument. It was also stated in Article 6 (2) of the ASEAN Charter that the admission of member states shall meet the following requirements: geographically located in the region of Southeast Asia; agreement from all ASEAN member states; agreement to be bound by the ASEAN Charter; and able to fulfill the obligations as a member. The process of Timor Leste’s accession, including the challenges and obstacles that Timor Leste faces, will be examined. Timor Leste is also the first country that officially applied for accession since the ASEAN Charter was enacted (Windraskinasih & Afriansyah, 2018).

Challengesfaced to Achieve Full ASEAN Membership Status

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, which are also known as the CLMV countries are the last four countries that managed to obtain full membership status in ASEAN in the 1990s. CLMV also successfully joined in a fairly short time in the accession process, which is less than five years (Thun, 2021). Compared to the Timor Leste accession process, it can be said that this is certainly very different remembering that it took more than a decade for Timor Leste and is still running until now. Nevertheless, CLMV and Timor Leste also faced a different legal instrument during their accession era. During the CLMV accession era, the legal instrument that was used was the Bangkok Declaration, which did not mention details in terms of its admission rules. It specifically states that ASEAN is open to all countries in the Southeast Asian region that agree to comply with ASEAN principles and objectives. It is also very different compared to the ASEAN Charter which is more rules-based and relies on consultation and consensus commitment (Thun, 2021; & Windraskinasih & Afriansyah, 2018).

In the discussion on whether Timor Leste is ready or not to be the 11th member of ASEAN, Laos,
Myanmar, and Timor Leste have occupied the lowest globalization index in Southeast Asia, namely with 29%, 34%, and 35% from 2012-2017. In terms of income, Timor Leste is categorized as a middle-income country along with Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. In terms of ASEAN economic growth in 2018, Timor Leste is included as a middle income country along with the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar, while Cambodia is categorized as a low income country (Sardiyo & Dhasman, 2019). It can also be said that, economically and in various aspects, Timor Leste has a similar readiness to several ASEAN members, especially CLMV countries. As mentioned in Thun (2021), during Cambodia’s accession which ended in 1999, the country was also experiencing a conflict that also intersected with Vietnam. It was also very unsimilar compared to Timor Leste’s current relationship with all ASEAN member countries.

Timor Leste in 2025, will it come to an end?

On the occasion of Timor Leste’s visit to the ASEAN Secretariat in 2015, it was mentioned that Timor Leste would be given observer status at the 27th ASEAN Summit. However, the status was not granted without a clear reason that is not accessible to the public (Almuttaqi, 2015), but Timor Leste attained observer status in 2022. As mentioned in The ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on the Application of Timor-Leste for ASEAN Membership, it grants the observer status for Timor Leste, while ASEAN member states and partner countries should fully support Timor Leste by providing capacity building assistance and other relevant support needed by Timor Leste to achieve full membership (ASEAN, 2022). According to the roadmap, Timor Leste might obtain full membership status in 2025 during Malaysia’s ASEAN leadership. Since the observer status was granted until 2024, Timor Leste’s relations with all ASEAN members and external partners are progressing positively with no problem found. Singapore and CLMV, which had previously shown concern and opposition, can also be seen to be showing quite a positive response towards Timor Leste.

Quoted from Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore (2024), during Timor Leste’s official visit agenda to Singapore in June 2024, Singapore reaffirmed its support for Timor Leste’s preparations to be the 11th ASEAN member through the Singapore Timor Leste ASEAN Readiness Support (STARS) that has been started since 2022. Moreover the Singapore Embassy in Dili was also inaugurated in April 2024 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, 2024). On the other hand, the interaction between Timor Leste and CLMV countries, especially Vietnam, can be said to be more difficult to find. However, since 2022 when observer status was granted, interaction indicating possible reservations towards Timor Leste from CLMV countries also wasn’t found. Cambodia has shown its support to Timor Leste’s accession in 2016 together with established cooperation in the fields of employment and the signing of cooperation documents in the sectors of demand, tourism and visa exemption. On the other hand, Myanmar has also expressed its support towards Timor Leste in the 43rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (Putra, et al., 2021).

Timor Leste’s accession to ASEAN could be concluded to have taken much longer time compared to other ASEAN member countries, especially the CLMV countries. Necessity of consensus from all member countries and the ASEAN Charter as a new legal instrument that is more rule based is also the main factor. Moreover, every ASEAN member country surely has diverse stances and political interests. The case of Timor Leste in securing its full membership in 2025 will depend on whether there will be any ASEAN member that raised for reservation.

Acknowledgement
This paper is adapted from several parts of the writer’s undergraduate thesis with the title ‘Analysis of Timor Leste’s Accession Process in ASEAN: Dynamics and Challenges’, supervised by Dr. Miranda P. Tahalele, S.IP., MA.

Author Short Bio
Jennifer is an International Relations graduate from Binus University that has interest on foreign
policy, development studies, and contemporary issues in international relations. She previously has also worked as an assistant to member of parliament at the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, consular function intern at the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Kuala Lumpur, and an economic function intern at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to ASEAN. She is also a research assistant at Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS).

References

Almuttaqi, A. I. (2015, October 11). The case for Timor Leste’s membership of ASEAN. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/11/the-case-timor-leste-s-membership-asean.html

ASEAN. (2022a). ASEAN LEADERS’ STATEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF TIMOR-LESTE FOR ASEAN MEMBERSHIP We, the Leaders of the Association of Southeast. Asean.org. Retrieved March 2, 2024, from https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/05-ASEAN-Leaders-Statement-on-the-Application-of-Timor-Leste-for-ASEAN-Membership.pdf

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Thun, T. (2021). “Invasion” or “Liberation”?: Contested Commemoration in Cambodia and within ASEAN. TRaNS: Trans-Regional And -National Studies of Southeast Asia, 9(2), 219-235.
https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.17

Windraskinasih, M., & Afriansyah, A. (2018). The struggle of becoming the 11th member state of ASEAN: Timor Leste’s case. Brawijaya Law Journal, 5(2), 74-101. https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.blj.2018.005.01.06